LLexfolio

Category: Legal Current Affairs

Monthly and weekly legal current affairs with practice MCQs for CLAT, AILET, AIBE and NET.

  • From Traditional Knowledge to Legal Protection: Exploring the Role of Geographical Indications in India

    1. Introduction: A Heritage That Deserves Protection

    Imagine an artisan in a Maharashtra village who makes leather footwear using techniques learned from his father and grandfather. The design, the quality and the craft of that footwear are part of his community’s identity. When mass-produced copies enter the market under the same name, without the same methods, the original artisans lose customers and income. Who, then, protects the knowledge, skills and identity that such communities have preserved for generations?

    This is the difficulty many traditional knowledge holders in India face. Traditional knowledge is not merely information handed down; it carries the experience, creativity and identity of local communities, and it covers traditional medicine, farming practices, handicrafts, food preparation, textile designs and knowledge of biodiversity. Yet it is increasingly exposed to unauthorised commercial use, imitation and a lack of legal recognition, while its holders receive little economic benefit.

    Intellectual property law offers several responses, and Geographical Indications are among the most relevant. A GI protects products whose quality, reputation or characteristics are linked to a particular place. The concern, however, is larger than protecting a product’s name: it is about protecting the identity, skills and interests of the communities behind it. This article examines how India can use GIs to that end, and where GIs fall short.

    2. Meaning and Importance of Traditional Knowledge

    The World Intellectual Property Organization (WIPO) describes traditional knowledge as “knowledge, know-how, skills and practices that are developed, sustained and passed on from generation to generation within a community, often forming part of its cultural or spiritual identity.”1

    In the Indian context, traditional knowledge is found mainly in five areas: agriculture (farming methods, seed saving, irrigation and crop practices); medicine (medicinal plants, Ayurveda and other traditional systems); handicrafts (weaving, pottery, leatherwork and embroidery); food (recipes, preparation and preservation methods); and biodiversity (knowledge of plants, animals and natural resources).

    Such knowledge sustains cultural identity, supports rural employment and promotes sustainable practices. Yet many of its holders lack the awareness or the resources to protect it through the intellectual property system.

    3. Geographical Indications as a Tool for Protecting Traditional Knowledge

    In India, GIs are governed by the Geographical Indications of Goods (Registration and Protection) Act, 1999 (“the GI Act”), which came into force on 15 September 2003.2 The first registrations followed in 2004. Section 2(1)(e) of the Act defines a geographical indication, in relation to goods, as “an indication which identifies such goods as agricultural goods, natural goods or manufactured goods as originating, or manufactured in the territory of a country, or a region or locality in that territory, where a given quality, reputation or other characteristic of such goods is essentially attributable to its geographical origin”.3

    Darjeeling Tea is protected because of its origin and reputation, the Kolhapuri Chappal because of the craft tradition of its region, and the Mahabaleshwar Strawberry because of the soil and climate in which it is grown. In each case, registration protects the identity and reputation of the product, prevents unauthorised use of the registered name, recognises the contribution of local producers, and helps the product in domestic and export markets.

    GI protection, however, does not cover every form of traditional knowledge. It protects goods linked to a place, not the underlying knowledge as such. A GI is therefore best understood as one important tool, not a complete solution.

    A. The GI Act, 1999

    The GI Act is the primary legislation on the subject. Its key provisions are these:

    • Section 2(1)(e): defines a geographical indication, as quoted above.

    • Section 11: allows any association of persons, producers, organisation or authority established by or under law, representing the interests of the producers of the goods, to apply for registration.4

    • Section 17: allows an individual producer to apply for registration as an authorised user of a registered GI.5

    • Section 21: gives the registered proprietor and authorised users the right to obtain relief for infringement, and gives authorised users “the exclusive right to the use of the geographical indication” in relation to the registered goods.6

    • Section 22: sets out what amounts to infringement, including use that misleads the public about the geographical origin of goods and use that amounts to unfair competition.7

    B. Other Indian Laws

    The Biological Diversity Act, 2002 regulates access to biological resources and associated knowledge and requires fair and equitable sharing of the benefits arising from their use.8 The Protection of Plant Varieties and Farmers’ Rights Act, 2001 recognises farmers as conservers and breeders of traditional varieties.9 The Patents Act, 1970 bars the patenting of “an invention which in effect, is traditional knowledge or which is an aggregation or duplication of known properties of traditionally known component or components”.10

    C. The Traditional Knowledge Digital Library (TKDL)

    India set up the TKDL in 2001 through the Council of Scientific and Industrial Research (CSIR) and the Ministry of AYUSH (then the Department of AYUSH). It documents formulations from Indian systems of medicine and yoga and makes them available to patent offices as prior art, so that patents are not wrongly granted over existing Indian knowledge.11 The TKDL is, however, a defensive tool. It blocks wrongful patents but does not, by itself, give communities economic rights or a share in benefits.

    D. The International Position

    Article 22 of the TRIPS Agreement requires WTO members to protect GIs generally, but Article 23 grants stronger, “additional” protection only to wines and spirits.12 Indian GIs such as Darjeeling Tea or the Kolhapuri Chappal therefore receive weaker protection abroad than European wines and spirits, which is why India has long pressed for extending the higher protection to all goods.

    5. Indian Examples

    A. Darjeeling Tea: Protecting an Agricultural Identity

    Darjeeling Tea, grown in the hills of West Bengal and known for its distinctive flavour and aroma, was India’s first registered GI. The Tea Board of India filed the application in October 2003, and the certificate of registration was issued on 29 October 2004.13 The Tea Board actively monitors the use of the name in India and abroad. The example shows how a GI can protect traditional agricultural practices and the interests of genuine producers.

    B. Kolhapuri Chappal: Protecting a Craft Tradition

    The Kolhapuri Chappal is hand-made leather footwear whose design and techniques have passed down through generations of artisan families. It was registered as a GI in December 2018, on a joint application by the leather development corporations of Maharashtra and Karnataka, and the registration covers four districts in each State.14

    The chappal also shows the limits of the law. In June 2025, Prada displayed toe-ring sandals closely resembling Kolhapuri chappals at its Milan show without acknowledging their origin. A public interest litigation filed by advocates in the Bombay High Court was dismissed on 16 July 2025, the Court holding that the remedy for infringement lies with the registered proprietors and authorised users under the GI Act, not with unrelated petitioners in a PIL.15 Registration gave the craft a legal identity, but enforcement still depends on the registered bodies, and protection overseas remains weak.

    Artisans also continue to face cheap imitations, low earnings, limited access to markets and little awareness of their rights. Legal recognition must be matched by practical measures that improve their working conditions and income.

    C. Mahabaleshwar Strawberry: Protecting a Farm Product

    The Mahabaleshwar Strawberry, grown in the Mahabaleshwar-Panchgani belt of Satara district, owes its identity to the region’s climate and soil. Shriram Fruit Processing Co-operative Society Limited applied for registration in February 2009, and the GI was granted in 2010.16 The registration has helped farmers build the product’s identity and consumer confidence, though they still need support with storage, transport, marketing and protection against imitation.

    Taken together, these examples show that GI registration is not a mere formality. It can protect regional identity, traditional skills and the livelihoods of local communities, provided it is backed by enforcement and support.

    6. Growth of GI Filings in India

    GI filings have grown sharply in recent years. According to the Office of the Controller General of Patents, Designs and Trade Marks, GI applications rose from 58 in 2020-21 to 275 in 2024-25, which the Ministry of Commerce and Industry described as a growth of about 380 per cent, the highest among all categories of intellectual property.17

    Numbers alone, however, do not measure protection. The real question is whether individual artisans and farmers are registering as authorised users, whether they know their rights, and whether registration actually raises their income.

    7. Issues and Challenges

    • No direct protection for knowledge: the GI Act protects goods linked to a place, not medicinal practices, cultural expressions or farming techniques as such.

    • Misappropriation: businesses may use traditional knowledge without recognising the communities that developed it.

    • Low awareness: many farmers and artisans do not know about GI registration or authorised-user rights.

    • Difficult procedures: proving origin and special characteristics requires documentation that small producers struggle to assemble.

    • Uneven benefits: registration does not guarantee higher income, and traders and intermediaries often capture most of the value.

    • Weak enforcement: imitation continues after registration, and as the Prada episode shows, only registered bodies can sue, while protection abroad is limited.

    • No benefit-sharing mechanism: the GI framework has no general system for sharing benefits with the holders of the underlying knowledge.

    8. Suggestions and Recommendations

    • Legal awareness: law colleges, legal aid bodies and lawyers should run programmes in rural areas on GI registration, authorised-user rights and remedies.

    • Simpler registration: authorised-user registration should be made cheaper and easier for individual artisans and farmers.

    • Community participation: communities should be involved in documenting their knowledge, with their consent and confidentiality respected.

    • Fair benefits: producer bodies should adopt transparent systems so that GI income reaches genuine producers.

    • Stronger enforcement: registered proprietors should be supported in acting against imitation and misleading labelling in India and abroad, and India should continue to press for TRIPS Article 23 protection for all goods.

    • Coordination: the GI Registry, biodiversity authorities and producer organisations should work together.

    • Market access: direct marketing and digital platforms should be promoted for genuine GI producers.

    • A dedicated law: India should consider a sui generis law for traditional knowledge that falls outside the GI framework.

    9. Conclusion

    Traditional knowledge is one of India’s most valuable cultural and intellectual assets. Without adequate legal protection, it risks misuse, exploitation and the gradual loss of its identity. Geographical Indications offer a useful mechanism, and Darjeeling Tea, the Kolhapuri Chappal and the Mahabaleshwar Strawberry show how registration can protect regional identity, craft and agricultural reputation.

    GI protection alone, however, cannot protect every aspect of traditional knowledge, nor does it guarantee fair income or real participation by communities. India needs a more community-centred approach in which lawyers, policymakers, educational institutions and government work together to raise awareness, simplify procedures, strengthen enforcement and secure fair benefits. Intellectual property protection should recognise not only the name of a product but also the people, skills and generations of knowledge behind it. Traditional knowledge is not merely part of India’s past; it is a living heritage that deserves recognition, respect and protection for the generations to come.

    Notes

    1. World Intellectual Property Organization, “Traditional Knowledge”, available at https://www.wipo.int/tk/en/tk/ (last visited 12 November 2026).↩

    2. The Geographical Indications of Goods (Registration and Protection) Act, 1999 (Act 48 of 1999), brought into force with effect from 15 September 2003.↩

    3. The GI Act, s. 2(1)(e). The clause further provides that, for manufactured goods, one of the activities of production, processing or preparation must take place in that territory, region or locality.↩

    4. The GI Act, s. 11(1).↩

    5. The GI Act, s. 17.↩

    6. The GI Act, s. 21(1)(a) and (b).↩

    7. The GI Act, s. 22.↩

    8. The Biological Diversity Act, 2002 (Act 18 of 2003), as amended by the Biological Diversity (Amendment) Act, 2023.↩

    9. The Protection of Plant Varieties and Farmers’ Rights Act, 2001 (Act 53 of 2001).↩

    10. The Patents Act, 1970, s. 3(p).↩

    11. Council of Scientific and Industrial Research, Traditional Knowledge Digital Library, available at https://www.tkdl.res.in.↩

    12. Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights, 1994, arts. 22 and 23.↩

    13. GI Registry, Application No. 1 (Darjeeling Tea, word), applicant Tea Board, filed 27 October 2003; Certificate No. 1 dated 29 October 2004.↩

    14. GI Registry, Application No. 169 (Kolhapuri Chappal), advertised in GI Journal No. 109 dated 9 August 2018 and registered on 11 December 2018. The Ministry of Textiles has described the GI status as granted in July 2019, when the certificate was publicised.↩

    15. Public interest litigation against Prada, Bombay High Court (Alok Aradhe CJ and Sandeep Marne J), order dated 16 July 2025; reported in LiveLaw, 17 July 2025.↩

    16. GI Registry, Application No. 154 (Mahabaleshwar Strawberry), applicant Shriram Fruit Processing Co-operative Society Ltd., filed 9 February 2009; registered in 2010.↩

    17. Office of the Controller General of Patents, Designs, Trade Marks and Geographical Indications, Annual Report 2024-25; Ministry of Commerce and Industry, press release dated 22 July 2025.↩

  • Condonation of Delay under Section 5 of the Limitation Act: Balancing Diligence and Justice

    By Jayanti, Gurugram University

    Limitation law asks parties to assert their rights within fixed periods. It protects litigants from claims that stay open forever and saves courts from deciding disputes after evidence has faded. But strict deadlines can also shut out a genuine case when the delay was beyond a party’s control. Section 5 of the Limitation Act, 1963 is where the law tries to reconcile these two concerns.

    What Section 5 Says

    Section 5 provides that “any appeal or any application, other than an application under any of the provisions of Order XXI of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908, may be admitted after the prescribed period, if the appellant or the applicant satisfies the court that he had sufficient cause for not preferring the appeal or making the application within such period”.[1] Its Explanation adds that being misled by an order, practice or judgment of the High Court in working out the period of limitation may amount to sufficient cause.

    Three features of the provision matter in practice:

    • It is discretionary. The word “may” gives the court a power, not the applicant a right. Offering an explanation does not entitle anyone to condonation.
    • The burden is on the applicant. The party seeking relief must set out the facts, ideally supported by an affidavit and documents.
    • It has limits. Section 5 applies to appeals and applications, not to the institution of ordinary suits, and it expressly excludes applications under Order XXI CPC.

    Section 3 of the Act sets the general rule that a suit, appeal or application filed after the prescribed period must be dismissed.[1] Section 5 is a limited exception to that rule. It must also be read with any special statute that has its own time limits; where a special law fixes an outer limit or excludes extension, Section 5 cannot be used to override it.

    What Counts as “Sufficient Cause”?

    The Act does not define “sufficient cause”, and deliberately so: the circumstances that can delay a filing are too varied for a closed list. Serious illness, genuine difficulty in obtaining necessary papers, an honest mistake about the right forum or a bona fide step taken in the wrong court may all qualify. None of them qualifies automatically. Their weight depends on evidence, the length of the delay, the applicant’s conduct and whether the circumstance actually prevented a timely filing.

    On the other side, negligence, deliberate inaction, lack of bona fides and a casual attitude to deadlines weigh against relief. Vague references to administrative difficulty, without saying what happened and when, are rarely enough. And the strength of the appeal on merits is not itself a reason for the delay; the inquiry is into why the party was late, not whether it would win.

    What the Supreme Court Has Said

    Collector, Land Acquisition, Anantnag v. Mst. Katiji (1987). The Court encouraged a justice-oriented approach, holding that “sufficient cause” should be read liberally so that cases are decided on merits rather than defeated by technicalities, where a reasonable explanation exists.[2]

    P.K. Ramachandran v. State of Kerala (1997). The Court reminded that limitation must be applied as the statute provides, and that delay cannot be condoned on equitable grounds alone where sufficient cause is not shown.[3]

    N. Balakrishnan v. M. Krishnamurthy (1998). The length of the delay matters less than the acceptability of the explanation. A long delay can be condoned if well explained; a short one can be refused if it is not.[4]

    Balwant Singh v. Jagdish Singh (2010). A liberal approach serves substantial justice but does not excuse negligence or lack of bona fides, and the court must remember that the successful party has acquired rights under the decree.[5]

    Office of the Chief Post Master General v. Living Media India Ltd. (2012). Government departments get no special indulgence for delay caused by routine bureaucratic process. Public authorities, like private litigants, must explain their delay credibly.[6]

    Read together, these decisions reject both automatic condonation and mechanical rejection. The court should take a practical view of a genuine explanation, but it must also protect finality and refuse explanations that are unsupported or show a careless disregard of the law.

    Condonation and Procedural Fairness

    Section 5 serves procedural fairness in several ways. It protects access to justice for a party who faced a real obstacle unrelated to the merits. It treats public and private litigants alike, as Living Media requires. And when courts give reasons, identifying the dates, the explanation and the evidence, their decisions become predictable and reviewable.

    Fairness also includes the other side. A successful litigant has an interest in finality and in not being dragged back into litigation without good reason. A decision that looks only at the applicant’s hardship gives an incomplete account of justice.

    A Practical Test

    A court deciding a condonation application can work through five questions:

    1. Is Section 5 available for this proceeding at all, or does a special statute exclude or limit it?
    2. What exactly is the period of delay, and has the applicant explained the whole of it?
    3. Is the explanation supported by evidence and consistent with the applicant’s conduct?
    4. Would condonation cause real prejudice to the other side, beyond the ordinary burden of defending a case?
    5. Can proportionate conditions, such as costs, address any avoidable prejudice?

    This is not a mechanical checklist. It is a way of making judicial discretion transparent. A litigant who was hospitalised for much of the limitation period and filed promptly on recovery stands in a very different position from one who ignored advice and offers no account of months of inactivity.

    Practical Pointers

    • Applicants should give a clear chronology: when time began to run, when it expired, what prevented filing, when the obstacle ended and what was done next.
    • Government departments should maintain limitation registers and alerts; internal file movement is not, by itself, sufficient cause.
    • Where delay is excusable but has caused avoidable expense, courts may impose proportionate costs, without making access to justice impossible for a poor litigant.
    • Legislatures should draft special limitation provisions clearly, especially where an outer limit is meant to be absolute.

    Conclusion

    Section 5 embodies a compromise between timely litigation and the need to avoid injustice from unavoidable delay. The Supreme Court’s decisions, from Katiji to Living Media, point to a balanced approach: liberal enough to prevent a genuine misfortune from defeating justice, and disciplined enough to keep deadlines meaningful. Condonation is a means of ensuring fair adjudication, not a reward for delay.

    Sources

    • [1] The Limitation Act, 1963 (Act 36 of 1963), ss. 3 and 5.
    • [2] Collector, Land Acquisition, Anantnag v. Mst. Katiji, (1987) 2 SCC 107.
    • [3] P.K. Ramachandran v. State of Kerala, (1997) 7 SCC 556.
    • [4] N. Balakrishnan v. M. Krishnamurthy, (1998) 7 SCC 123.
    • [5] Balwant Singh (Dead) v. Jagdish Singh, (2010) 8 SCC 685.
    • [6] Office of the Chief Post Master General v. Living Media India Ltd., (2012) 3 SCC 563.

    About the author: Jayanti is a law student at Gurugram University.

  • When Poverty Becomes a Barrier to Bail: Should Courts Assess an Accused’s Ability to Pay?

    By Atharv Kumar Suneri, B.A. LL.B. (3rd Year)

    The Problem

    Imagine two accused persons charged under the same provision, in comparable circumstances and with a similar risk of absconding. The court grants both of them bail on a monetary condition. The first can afford the amount and walks out. The second cannot, and stays in custody. The law treated them alike on paper, yet only one of them is free, and the only difference between them is money.

    This article asks whether that outcome is consistent with the Constitution, what the Supreme Court has said about it, and whether courts should assess a person’s ability to pay before fixing monetary bail conditions.

    When a Bail Order Does Not Secure Liberty

    A person may receive a bail order and still remain in jail if they cannot meet its conditions. The harm does not stop with the accused. Their family loses support, a job may be lost, and dependants suffer, all because of the accused’s financial position rather than anything the court found about the case. The problem is therefore wider than it first appears, and it has to be seen in the light of both practical realities and the legal purpose of bail.

    The Constitutional Principles

    Article 14 guarantees equality before the law and the equal protection of the laws. When two similarly placed accused persons are treated differently in practice only because one can pay and the other cannot, the equal protection of the law is weakened. Courts should therefore consider the circumstances of each accused so that monetary conditions are not excessive or unfair.

    Article 21 protects life and personal liberty, which can be taken away only according to procedure established by law. When an accused who has been granted bail remains in custody only because they cannot afford the condition, a serious question of personal liberty arises. The court should ask whether the condition is justified, proportionate and consistent with the law, and the accused’s financial inability should not be ignored in that assessment.

    In Hussainara Khatoon v. Home Secretary, State of Bihar, the Supreme Court highlighted the plight of undertrial prisoners kept in jail for long periods and recognised speedy trial as part of Article 21.[1] A bail condition that a poor accused cannot meet creates exactly the kind of avoidable detention the Court warned against.

    Moti Ram: The Importance of Individual Circumstances

    In Moti Ram v. State of Madhya Pradesh, the Supreme Court criticised the practice of fixing bail amounts and sureties without regard to the accused’s means, and stressed that bail conditions must be fair to the person who has to meet them.[2] The case shows that granting bail is not the end of the court’s task. The court must also ask whether the accused is actually capable of meeting the condition imposed.

    Moti Ram does not hold that monetary conditions are unlawful in themselves. Its point is that the court should decide them after considering whether the person can realistically comply. This is an individualised approach to bail.

    What the BNSS Says

    Section 484 of the Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023 (earlier Section 440 CrPC) requires the amount of every bond to be fixed with due regard to the circumstances of the case and provides that it shall not be excessive.[3] Read with Moti Ram, this supports careful scrutiny of conditions that are practically impossible for a particular accused to meet.

    The legal position will still depend on the type of case. Financial circumstances cannot override statutory restrictions on bail in serious offences or under special laws. But within the framework that applies, the court can ask whether a monetary condition is really needed, or whether a less burdensome alternative would achieve the same legitimate purpose.

    The Supreme Court has also acted on this problem directly. In In Re Policy Strategy for Grant of Bail, it directed that if an accused is not released within seven days of a bail order, the jail superintendent must inform the District Legal Services Authority, and that if bail bonds are not furnished within one month, the court may on its own consider whether the conditions need to be modified or relaxed.[4]

    Why Ability to Pay Should Matter

    Assessing ability to pay does not mean that the court must grant bail to everyone. It means checking whether the person can actually meet the condition imposed. In practice, a court fixing monetary conditions could ask:

    • What is the purpose of the condition in this case, and is a monetary condition necessary to achieve it?
    • How serious is the alleged offence, what does the statute require, and what is the risk of the accused absconding or influencing witnesses?
    • Is there a less burdensome alternative, such as a lower amount, a personal bond or other non-monetary conditions?
    • Can this accused realistically pay what is being asked?

    These questions cannot guarantee any particular result, but they ensure that financial capacity is treated as a relevant consideration rather than ignored.

    The Need for Reasoned Decisions

    At present, outcomes vary from court to court, and there is no uniform approach to accused persons who cannot meet monetary conditions. One useful reform would be for courts to record, briefly, why a particular amount was fixed and whether the accused’s means were considered. This would make decisions more consistent and easier to review.

    Any inquiry into means should be fair and not intrusive, so that it does not become another burden on poor families. And it must sit alongside the seriousness of the offence and the requirements of any special law: financial capacity should inform the decision where relevant, not replace the other conditions the law requires.

    Making the Right to Bail Meaningful

    There is a real difference between obtaining a bail order and actually being released. If a person cannot pay, the order does not give them liberty. The reasoning in Moti Ram asks courts to close that gap by making decisions that are genuine and proportionate to the circumstances of each case.

    The answer is not to grant bail to everyone who cannot pay. It is to assess each case carefully, so that the conditions imposed serve a legitimate purpose and are proportionate. Personal liberty should not depend on a person’s bank balance when a reasonable and lawful alternative can achieve the same purpose.

    Sources

    • [1] Hussainara Khatoon v. Home Secretary, State of Bihar, (1980) 1 SCC 81.
    • [2] Moti Ram v. State of Madhya Pradesh, (1978) 4 SCC 47.
    • [3] Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023, s. 484 (earlier s. 440 CrPC).
    • [4] In Re Policy Strategy for Grant of Bail, SMWP (Crl.) No. 4 of 2021, order dated 31 January 2023 (Supreme Court of India).

    About the author: Atharv Kumar Suneri is a third-year B.A. LL.B. student with academic interests in constitutional law, criminal justice and access to justice.

  • Got a Police Notice in Delhi? What to Do Before You Walk into the Thana

    By Advocate Kanisth Manuja, Delhi High Court

    In short: A police notice in Delhi is usually either a witness notice under Section 179 of the Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023 (BNSS) or a notice of appearance to a possible accused under Section 35 BNSS, which replaced Section 41A CrPC. Find out which one it is, ask for the FIR number and sections in writing, take legal advice before appearing, and comply. A person who complies with a Section 35 notice is generally not to be arrested for that offence unless the officer records reasons why arrest is necessary.[1]

    A police notice rarely arrives at a convenient time. It may be a slip handed over at your door or a call from an unfamiliar number asking you to “come to the station for a few questions”. Many people either panic and go in unprepared, or ignore it and hope it goes away. Neither helps. Here is a practical guide to the most common notices under the BNSS and the steps that tend to matter.

    First, Find Out What Kind of Notice It Is

    The wording of the notice tells you where you stand. Two situations are common, and they carry very different consequences.

    1. You are called as a witness (Section 179 BNSS). The police can require anyone who appears to be acquainted with the facts of a case to attend and answer questions.[2] You are not accused of anything, and the notice should not suggest otherwise.
    2. You are called as a possible accused (Section 35 BNSS). For many offences, the police need not arrest you straight away and can instead issue a notice requiring you to appear. This provision replaced Section 41A of the Code of Criminal Procedure and is meant to stop arrest from being the default response to an allegation, especially for less serious offences.[1]

    A notice that names no section, gives no case details or only says “appear at the station” is a problem. Ask the officer, in writing or through your advocate, for the FIR number, the police station, the sections invoked and the officer’s name and designation. Do this politely. A written record of your request protects you later.

    Your Rights if You Are Called as a Witness

    Section 179 contains a protection many people never hear about. A male under fifteen or over sixty years of age, a woman, a person with a mental or physical disability and a person with an acute illness cannot be required to attend at any place other than where they reside.[2] In practice, questioning should take place where you live, although you may go to the police station if you are willing to.

    If you fall into one of these groups, say so in a short written reply and offer to be questioned at home at a mutually convenient time. A woman called to a police station as a witness should consider invoking this right. It exists for good reasons, and you do not have to waive it.

    Remember too that a witness is not a suspect. If the questions start to sound as if you are being treated as an accused, speak to an advocate before answering further.

    If the Notice Is Under Section 35: Comply, and Prepare

    If the notice is under Section 35, comply with it. The law gives a real benefit for doing so: a person who complies and continues to comply is generally not to be arrested for the offence in the notice unless the officer records reasons why arrest is necessary.[1] Ignoring the notice gives the police a ground to say you are not cooperating, which can lead to arrest. Before you appear:

    • Read the notice carefully and note the date, time, place and officer named.
    • Consult an advocate beforehand. Section 38 BNSS entitles a person who is arrested and interrogated to meet an advocate of their choice during interrogation, though not throughout it.[3] Whether or not you are arrested, it is far better to take advice before you walk in than during a break.
    • Carry identity proof and any documents the notice asks for. Keep copies of everything you hand over and ask for an acknowledgement.
    • Tell a family member where you are going and when you expect to return.
    • Be calm and truthful. Do not guess or fill gaps with assumptions. “I do not remember” or “I would need to check my records” is a legitimate answer when it is true.

    Know the Limits on Questioning

    Under Article 20(3) of the Constitution, no person accused of an offence can be compelled to be a witness against himself. In practice, you may decline to answer a question where the answer would expose you to a criminal charge, but you must answer other questions truthfully.

    A statement you make to the police during investigation is written down by the officer. Under Section 181 BNSS, it is not to be signed by the person making it,[4] but you should read, or ask to hear, what has been recorded. If something is recorded wrongly, ask for a correction. If you do not understand it, say so.

    Never sign a blank paper or a document you have not read, and never agree to “settle” or write an apology under pressure inside a police station without independent advice.

    If You Are Arrested Anyway

    Arrest sometimes happens despite compliance, or without any prior notice. The basic safeguards remain:[5]

    • You must be told the grounds of your arrest (Section 47 BNSS).
    • A relative, friend or other person you nominate must be informed of your arrest and where you are held (Section 48 BNSS).
    • You must be produced before a Magistrate within twenty-four hours of arrest, excluding travel time (Section 58 BNSS).
    • You are entitled to a medical examination (Section 53 BNSS) and to meet an advocate of your choice during interrogation, though not throughout it (Section 38 BNSS).

    If you are held without being told why, or beyond the permitted time, tell your advocate immediately, because that is a ground for urgent court intervention.

    Common Mistakes to Avoid

    • Treating a notice as a mere formality. It is a legal document with consequences.
    • Going alone without advice because “I have nothing to hide”. Innocent people can still make damaging statements by speculating.
    • Ignoring the notice because the case seems to be a family or property dispute. In Delhi, many criminal complaints arise out of property, matrimonial and money disputes. They are still criminal proceedings.
    • Discussing the case on WhatsApp or social media. Messages can be produced as evidence.
    • Deleting or editing documents and chats. That can turn a manageable situation into a serious one.

    A Word on Anticipatory Bail

    If you have genuine reason to fear arrest, for instance because a complaint has been filed against you in a family or property dispute, ask an advocate whether anticipatory bail under Section 482 BNSS is appropriate.[6] Courts decide each case on its facts and nobody can promise a result, but acting before an arrest generally gives you more options than acting after it.

    The Bottom Line

    A police notice is not a verdict. It is a procedural step, and the law gives you rights at each stage. Identify what kind of notice it is, respond in writing, take advice early, appear when required, stay truthful, and do not sign what you have not read.

    This article is general information for the public and not legal advice. Facts differ from case to case, so speak to a qualified advocate about your situation.

    Sources

    • [1] Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023, s. 35 (notice of appearance; earlier s. 41A CrPC).
    • [2] BNSS, s. 179(1) and its proviso.
    • [3] BNSS, s. 38.
    • [4] BNSS, s. 181(1).
    • [5] BNSS, ss. 47, 48, 53 and 58.
    • [6] BNSS, s. 482.

    About the author: Advocate Kanisth Manuja practises civil, criminal and property law before the Delhi High Court and writes plain-language guides on Indian law and court procedure at advkanisthmanuja.com. AI tools assisted the author with drafting; the content was checked against the statutory text.

  • Section 125 CrPC: Who Can Be Impleaded?

    By Md Kaif, 4th Year, Galgotias University

    When a proceeding under Section 125 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (now Section 144 of the Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023) reaches the High Court in revision or appeal, a recurring question arises: who should actually be shown as a party? The issue matters most where the State is added as a party even though the underlying dispute concerns maintenance between the claimant and the person from whom maintenance is sought.

    Section 125 Proceedings Are Civil in Nature

    The Supreme Court has repeatedly described proceedings under Section 125 CrPC as civil in nature. In Vijay Kumar Prasad v. State of Bihar, the Court explained that, notwithstanding their placement in the Code of Criminal Procedure, these proceedings possess a civil character.[1] The Court reaffirmed this in Iqbal Bano v. State of U.P., stating expressly that proceedings under Section 125 CrPC are civil in nature.[2]

    The provision’s placement in the CrPC does not make a maintenance proceeding a prosecution for a criminal offence. It determines a statutory claim to maintenance and the corresponding liability of the person from whom maintenance is claimed. This civil character is relevant not merely to the nature of the relief, but also to identifying the persons whose rights and liabilities are genuinely in controversy.

    Civil in Nature, Not a Civil Suit

    The position becomes clearer where the proceeding is before a Family Court. In Shiva Pankaj v. State of U.P., the Allahabad High Court considered whether its supervisory jurisdiction under Section 483 CrPC could be invoked against a Family Court dealing with a Section 125 proceeding.[3] Relying on Section 7(2)(a) of the Family Courts Act, 1984, the Court held that, while dealing with proceedings under Chapter IX CrPC, the Family Court exercises the jurisdiction of a Judicial Magistrate First Class, and that an application under Section 483 CrPC seeking expeditious disposal of a Section 125 proceeding was therefore maintainable.

    The significance of Shiva Pankaj is not that a Section 125 proceeding becomes a civil suit. It shows that the civil character of the maintenance claim coexists with a procedural framework drawn from criminal law. That distinction becomes important when deciding who should appear as a party once the matter reaches the High Court.

    The civil character of the proceeding does not mean that every provision of the Code of Civil Procedure automatically applies. The question is whether the principles on necessary and proper parties help identify the persons whose legal rights or liabilities require adjudication.

    At the High Court Stage

    Once the matter reaches the High Court in revision or appeal, the question is not whether the State plays some general role in the administration of criminal justice. It is narrower: why should the State be a party to a maintenance dispute when no maintenance is claimed from it?

    The State does not owe the maintenance claimed. The dispute concerns entitlement and liability as between the claimant and the respondent. The State is therefore not automatically a party in every revision or appeal arising from a Section 125 matter; its presence needs a legal basis under the appellate or revisional jurisdiction actually invoked.

    Which Principles Govern Impleadment

    In a 2026 decision, the Delhi High Court considered whether the second wife of a respondent husband could be impleaded in a revision arising from a Section 125 maintenance claim filed by the first wife.[4] The Court held that she was neither a necessary nor a proper party, as the proceedings concerned the rights and obligations between the claimant and the person against whom maintenance was sought. It also cautioned against expanding a summary maintenance proceeding by bringing in persons whose presence is not required to decide the dispute. Relevance to the surrounding circumstances of a claim is not, by itself, enough to confer party status.

    For deciding who ought to appear as a necessary or proper party, the principles in Order I Rules 1 and 3 CPC are relevant, and Order I Rule 10(2) empowers the Court to strike out “the name of any party improperly joined” or to add a person whose presence is necessary “in order to enable the Court effectually and completely to adjudicate upon and settle all the questions involved”.[5]

    The Allahabad High Court in Arvind Kumar v. State of U.P. observed that Section 144 BNSS proceedings are summary in nature and that criminal procedure contains no specific provision for impleading a party in the manner of Order I Rule 10 CPC.[6] This does not make party status irrelevant. It requires the Court to examine the actual controversy and decide whether a proposed party’s presence is necessary for an effective adjudication.

    Applied to a maintenance dispute, these principles point to the persons whose legal rights and liabilities are directly in issue. The State neither claims maintenance nor bears the liability to pay it. Its presence cannot be justified merely because Section 125 CrPC or Section 144 BNSS sits within the criminal procedural framework.

    Relevance Is Not Party Status

    The distinction between a person’s connection with a proceeding and their status as a necessary party is well established. In Kasturi v. Iyyamperumal, the Supreme Court laid down two tests for a necessary party under Order I Rule 10(2) CPC: there must be a right to some relief against that party in respect of the controversy, and no effective decree can be passed in that party’s absence.[7]

    In a Section 125 CrPC or Section 144 BNSS dispute, the substantive controversy is ordinarily between the claimant and the person liable to maintain. No relief is claimed against the State, and its legal liability does not need to be decided. Its presence cannot be treated as necessary merely because the proceeding originates under criminal procedure.

    The Question to Ask in Revision or Appeal

    The same test applies when the matter reaches the High Court. The question is not simply who appeared in the original proceeding, but whose legal rights or obligations are actually involved in the challenge. Where the State has no substantive interest in the maintenance relief, and an effective decision can be made between the claimant and the person against whom maintenance is sought, its presence is not justified by the procedural form of the proceeding alone.

    Conclusion

    Section 125 CrPC, now Section 144 BNSS, is civil in nature though it operates within a criminal procedural framework. At the revisional or appellate stage, party status should be decided by the rights and liabilities actually in dispute, not by the statute under which the proceeding began. The claimant and the person liable to maintain are the substantive parties. Applying the necessary-party principle, the State does not become a party merely because the proceeding arises under the CrPC or BNSS. Procedural form cannot, by itself, create substantive party status.

    Sources

    • [1] Vijay Kumar Prasad v. State of Bihar, (2004) 5 SCC 196.
    • [2] Iqbal Bano v. State of U.P., (2007) 6 SCC 785.
    • [3] Shiva Pankaj v. State of U.P., Application u/s 483 No. 426 of 2024, 2024:AHC-LKO:42668 (Allahabad High Court, Lucknow Bench).
    • [4] Delhi High Court, 2026:DHC:3846 (second wife not a necessary or proper party in the first wife’s maintenance revision).
    • [5] Code of Civil Procedure, 1908, Order I Rules 1, 3 and 10(2).
    • [6] Arvind Kumar v. State of U.P., 2026 LiveLaw (AB) 161.
    • [7] Kasturi v. Iyyamperumal, (2005) 6 SCC 733.

    About the author: Md Kaif is a fourth-year law student at Galgotias University.

  • How Do Poor People Get Justice?

    By Kanak, Guru Jambheshwar University of Science and Technology, Hisar, Haryana

    Introduction: When Justice Becomes Expensive

    Can a person receive justice if they cannot afford a lawyer? In India, the answer should be yes. The Constitution promises equality before the law, and the legal system provides mechanisms such as free legal aid and Lok Adalats to help people who face financial barriers. However, many people still struggle to understand their rights, find legal assistance and navigate court proceedings. For a poor person, the cost of justice may involve much more than a lawyer’s fee. Travel to court, loss of daily wages, paperwork and repeated hearings can make pursuing a case difficult. The real challenge, therefore, is not only to provide legal rights on paper but also to make those rights accessible in practice.

    The Real Cost of Seeking Justice

    Legal disputes can arise in anyone’s life. A worker may not receive wages, a tenant may face an unlawful eviction, a woman may experience domestic violence, or a family may become involved in a property dispute. People with sufficient resources may be able to hire a lawyer and pursue their cases, but financially disadvantaged people may have to choose between seeking justice and meeting their daily needs.

    Some people avoid approaching the authorities because they fear legal expenses. Others do not know which office to visit or which documents they need. Complicated legal language can make the process even more difficult for someone unfamiliar with the justice system. These barriers can discourage people from asserting their rights. When access to justice depends heavily on a person’s ability to pay, the principle of equality before the law becomes difficult to realise.

    The Constitutional Promise of Equal Justice

    The Indian Constitution provides an important foundation for access to justice. Article 14 guarantees equality before the law and equal protection of the laws. Article 21 protects life and personal liberty, subject to the procedure established by law. Access to legal remedies and fair procedures is important to the effective protection of these rights. Most directly, Article 39A directs the State to ensure that the legal system promotes justice on the basis of equal opportunity and to provide free legal aid through suitable legislation, schemes or other means so that economic or other disabilities do not prevent people from securing justice.[1]

    These constitutional provisions establish an important principle: financial hardship should not, by itself, become a barrier that prevents a person from seeking legal protection. However, a constitutional promise must be supported by practical arrangements. People need to know where legal aid is available, who qualifies for it and how to apply.

    Free Legal Aid: Help for Those Who Qualify

    The Legal Services Authorities Act, 1987 provides a framework for free legal services through legal services institutions at national, state, district and local levels.[2] Under Section 12 of the Act, specified categories of people are eligible to seek legal services, subject to the applicable legal requirements. These include members of Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes, women, children, persons with disabilities, victims of trafficking and certain forms of exploitation, industrial workmen, eligible people in custody, and people whose annual income falls below the prescribed limit. Other categories may also qualify under applicable state rules.

    This distinction is important: not every person who describes themselves as poor automatically qualifies under the same income rule. Eligibility depends on the applicable statutory category and the relevant rules. Section 13 also requires the concerned legal services institution to be satisfied that the person has a genuine case to pursue or defend.[2]

    Free legal services can include assistance from an advocate, legal advice, preparation of legal documents and other expenses connected with proceedings where applicable. These services can help eligible people understand their options and present their cases without bearing the usual cost of private legal representation.[3] People seeking assistance can approach the appropriate District Legal Services Authority (DLSA) at the district court, a Taluk Legal Services Committee, or the relevant State Legal Services Authority. They can also consult the National Legal Services Authority (NALSA) website to understand the application process. Awareness is essential. A service can make a real difference only when people know it exists and understand how to access it.

    For a step-by-step explanation of eligibility and how to apply, see our guide on free legal aid in India and the NALSA helpline.

    Lok Adalats: An Alternative Route to Settlement

    Another mechanism that may help people resolve certain disputes is the Lok Adalat. Organised under the Legal Services Authorities Act, 1987, Lok Adalats provide a forum for amicable settlement of eligible disputes at the pre-litigation stage or when cases are pending before a court.[4] They commonly deal with suitable civil disputes and compoundable criminal cases. Matters involving offences that cannot legally be compounded cannot be settled through an ordinary Lok Adalat.

    The process depends on settlement between the parties, and its members must not pressure or force anyone to compromise. A regular Lok Adalat does not decide a dispute on its merits when the parties fail to reach a settlement. In such a situation, the matter may proceed through the appropriate legal route. Under Section 21 of the Act, a Lok Adalat award is treated as a decree of a civil court and is final and binding on the parties, with no ordinary appeal against it.[2][4] Therefore, people should understand the proposed settlement and its consequences before agreeing to it. Lok Adalats can offer a useful way to resolve suitable disputes, but they are not a substitute for a full court hearing in every case.

    Why Do Barriers to Justice Remain?

    Despite these mechanisms, several practical problems continue to affect access to justice.

    • Lack of awareness. People may not know that free legal aid is available or that they can approach a legal services authority for help. Some may assume that every legal service requires payment.
    • Difficult procedures. Legal documents, formal language and unfamiliar court processes can discourage people who have little experience with the system.
    • Cost in time and income. Even when legal representation is free, transport expenses, time away from work and repeated court visits can create hardship.
    • Quality and accessibility of assistance. Providing a lawyer is important, but people also need to understand their cases, communicate their concerns and receive appropriate guidance.
    • Social and economic inequality. A person who does not know their rights may find it especially difficult to challenge unfair treatment or feel confident approaching public institutions.

    These difficulties show why access to justice requires more than the existence of laws. It also requires effective implementation, awareness and support for the people who need it most.

    How Can Access to Justice Be Improved?

    Several practical steps could make the system more accessible.

    • Legal awareness programmes should reach villages, schools, colleges and low-income communities. Information about legal aid should be explained in simple language and made available through reliable local channels.
    • Legal services authorities should make application procedures clear and accessible. People should be able to understand the eligibility requirements, the documents needed and the stages of the process without unnecessary confusion.
    • Legal aid should be accompanied by clear communication. Applicants need to know how their cases are progressing and what is expected of them.
    • Technology can help people find information, access official resources and explore available services. However, online systems should complement, and not replace, accessible assistance for people who lack smartphones, internet access or digital literacy.
    • Law students and educational institutions can contribute through supervised legal awareness activities, community outreach and support programmes organised with appropriate legal services institutions. Such efforts can help people learn about their rights and identify the proper channels for assistance.

    Conclusion: Justice Must Reach Everyone

    The ability to seek justice should not depend solely on a person’s financial position. India’s Constitution, the Legal Services Authorities Act, 1987, free legal aid institutions and Lok Adalats provide important mechanisms for reducing barriers to justice. Yet their effectiveness depends on public awareness, accessible procedures and meaningful support.

    The central question is not simply whether legal rights exist, but whether people can realistically exercise them when they need protection. A fair justice system must be understandable and accessible to ordinary people, including those who cannot afford private legal representation. When people know their rights and can reach the institutions designed to protect them, the promise of equality before the law becomes more meaningful. Justice should not be a privilege reserved for those who can afford it. It must remain a right that people can realistically seek, regardless of their financial circumstances.

    References

    • [1] The Constitution of India, Articles 14, 21 and 39A.
    • [2] The Legal Services Authorities Act, 1987, Sections 12, 13 and 21.
    • [3] National Legal Services Authority (NALSA), official information on legal aid and legal services.
    • [4] National Legal Services Authority (NALSA), official information on Lok Adalats.

    About the author: Kanak is a first-year B.A. LL.B. student at Guru Jambheshwar University of Science and Technology, Hisar, Haryana.

  • Protecting Critical Infrastructure in Cyberspace: Is India’s Legal Framework Preventive or Reactive?

    By Saburie Kanal, Christ (Deemed to be University), Delhi NCR

    A cyberattack on a typical digital system may cause data loss or business interruption. An attack on critical infrastructure, however, can affect essential services far beyond the system that was targeted. A disruption to a power system, for example, may have repercussions for hospitals, banking, telecommunications, transport and public administration. This is why the legal relevance of Critical Information Infrastructure (CII) stems from the effects of its failure rather than its technical sophistication.

    The Explanation to Section 70(1) of the Information Technology Act, 2000 defines CII as “the computer resource, the incapacitation or destruction of which, shall have debilitating impact on national security, economy, public health or safety.”[1] Section 70 also allows the appropriate Government to declare certain computer resources to be protected systems. Section 70(3) provides that a person who “secures access or attempts to secure access to a protected system” in contravention of the section may face imprisonment of up to ten years and a fine. Section 66F(2) separately provides that a person who commits or conspires to commit cyber terrorism may be punished with imprisonment for life.

    India has built an institutional framework for this through the IT Act, the National Critical Information Infrastructure Protection Centre (NCIIPC), the Indian Computer Emergency Response Team (CERT-In) and sector-specific regulators. Section 70A provides for a national nodal agency for the protection of CII, a role performed by NCIIPC, while Section 70B makes CERT-In the national agency for incident response.[2] The CERT-In Directions of 2022 require covered entities to report specified cyber incidents within six hours, retain logs for 180 days, synchronise system clocks and designate a point of contact for communication with CERT-In.[3]

    At first glance, this looks like a structure with built-in deterrence. The real question, however, is whether having preventive institutions makes the legal framework itself preventive.

    The Prevention Problem

    India’s framework includes strong preventive elements. NCIIPC identifies critical sectors and carries out risk and vulnerability assessments. CERT-In issues alerts and advisories, allowing organisations to respond to risks before they become major incidents. These functions show that Indian law does not merely wait for an attack to occur.[2]

    However, some of the framework’s most important requirements apply only once an incident has been identified. The six-hour reporting requirement under the CERT-In Directions is an example. Quick notification can help authorities coordinate a response and may reduce the harm, but the obligation is triggered only when an incident has been discovered. This creates an important distinction between responding quickly and preventing adequately.[3]

    The 180-day log retention requirement presents a similar challenge. Logs are useful for assessing, investigating and planning responses to cyber incidents that have already occurred, and they may help identify future threats by revealing repeated patterns. They do not, however, prevent an attack. The framework therefore gives strong tools for understanding what happened, but fewer clear standards for judging whether organisations were adequately prepared beforehand.

    Is Fragmentation Making Prevention Harder?

    Another issue is institutional fragmentation. CII protection does not run through a single authority. NCIIPC and CERT-In operate alongside sector-specific regulators such as the Reserve Bank of India (RBI), the Securities and Exchange Board of India (SEBI), the Insurance Regulatory and Development Authority of India (IRDAI) and the Department of Telecommunications (DoT).[4]

    Sector-specific regulation is not always a flaw. Banking, telecommunications and electricity systems each carry distinct technical risks, which specialist regulators can address. The problem arises when several bodies enforce different mandates without assigning clear and comparable obligations for prevention, information sharing and accountability. The National Cyber Security Policy, 2013 illustrates the difficulty: it sets out broad aims, but it is a policy statement and not a set of binding standards. A preventive framework cannot rest on broad policy objectives alone. It must also define responsibilities and standards against which preparedness can be measured.[5]

    The Supply-Chain Blind Spot

    Supply-chain security is a further challenge. Critical infrastructure increasingly depends on imported hardware, software and technical components. This exposes it to risks such as vulnerabilities introduced during manufacturing, compromised components and flaws in third-party systems. A supply-chain vulnerability may exist for a long time before it emerges as a recognisable cyber incident, so it may escape a structure that relies on reporting after an issue has been observed. This is where preventive regulation matters: operators of critical infrastructure should be required not only to report incidents but also to examine their suppliers, test their systems and fix known vulnerabilities before they are exploited.

    Conclusion

    India’s CII protection system is best described as a hybrid model. NCIIPC’s protective mandate and risk assessments, together with CERT-In’s early-warning services, show a real preventive purpose. The real obstacle is not a lack of law but a gap between prevention on paper and prevention in practice. Protecting critical infrastructure cannot depend only on India’s ability to respond quickly to an attack. The most important measure of cybersecurity law should be the extent to which it requires critical infrastructure operators to identify, test and address vulnerabilities before they are exploited.

    Recommendations

    The question is not whether India needs new cyber laws. It already has a substantial legal and institutional framework. The more important question is whether the current framework can measure prevention. A stronger approach would require critical infrastructure operators to conduct risk assessments, test their resilience and incident response, address known vulnerabilities within specified timeframes, and examine supply-chain risks. These duties should be backed by closer coordination among NCIIPC, CERT-In and the sectoral regulators. Such requirements would shift the focus from asking “Was the incident reported?” to asking “What was done to prevent it?”[6]

    India’s approach should not be dismissed as weak or reactive. It has real preventive institutions. The concern is that preventive purpose is not the same as preventive responsibility. A framework becomes truly preventive only when operators are required to demonstrate their readiness before a cyberattack.

    References

    • [1] Information Technology Act, 2000, s 70(1), Explanation.
    • [2] Information Technology Act, 2000, ss 70A and 70B; Information Technology (National Critical Information Infrastructure Protection Centre and Manner of Performing Functions and Duties) Rules, 2013.
    • [3] Indian Computer Emergency Response Team (CERT-In), Directions under sub-section (6) of Section 70B of the Information Technology Act, 2000 relating to information security practices, procedure, prevention, response and reporting of cyber incidents for Safe & Trusted Internet, No. 20(3)/2022-CERT-In (28 April 2022).
    • [4] Information Technology Act, 2000, ss 70A and 70B; Reserve Bank of India, Master Direction on Information Technology Governance, Risk, Controls and Assurance Practices, RBI/2023-24/107 (7 November 2023); Securities and Exchange Board of India, Cybersecurity and Cyber Resilience Framework (CSCRF) for SEBI Regulated Entities, Circular SEBI/HO/ITD-1/ITD_CSC_EXT/P/CIR/2024/113 (20 August 2024); Insurance Regulatory and Development Authority of India, Information and Cyber Security Guidelines, 2023 (24 April 2023).
    • [5] Ministry of Communications and Information Technology, Government of India, National Cyber Security Policy 2013 (2013).
    • [6] Ministry of Communications and Information Technology, Government of India, National Cyber Security Policy 2013 (2013).

    About the author: Saburie Kanal is a third-year law student at Christ (Deemed to be University), Delhi NCR.

  • ANI v OpenAI: Can an AI Company Train Its Model on Copyrighted Content in India?

    By Taniya, University Institute of Legal Studies, Himachal Pradesh University, Shimla

    Short answer: not yet decided, but for now the Delhi High Court has leaned towards the AI company. On 24 July 2026 it refused to stop OpenAI from storing and using ANI’s news content to train ChatGPT, finding at a prima facie stage that this fell within fair dealing. The order is only interim, and the Government has separately proposed a very different solution: a compulsory licence with payment to creators.

    This article explains the dispute, the law behind it, and what law students and exam aspirants should take from it. It explains the law and is not legal advice.

    1. What Is the Dispute About?

    In November 2024, Asian News International (ANI) sued OpenAI in the Delhi High Court (ANI Media Pvt. Ltd. v. OpenAI, CS(COMM) 1028/2024).[1] ANI made two main complaints:

    • The training claim: OpenAI copied and stored ANI’s news content, without a licence, to train ChatGPT.
    • The output claim: ChatGPT’s answers reproduced ANI’s content.

    ANI asked for an interim injunction, that is, an order restraining OpenAI until the case is finally decided. OpenAI argued, among other things, that the Delhi court had no jurisdiction and that its use of the content was lawful.[2]

    2. What Did the Delhi High Court Decide?

    On 24 July 2026, Justice Amit Bansal delivered a detailed interim order dismissing ANI’s injunction application.[2] Three points stand out.

    Jurisdiction. The court held that it could hear the case because ANI is based in Delhi and ChatGPT is accessed and used in India, relying on earlier authority that traditional territorial limits cannot be applied rigidly to cloud-hosted data.[3]

    Training. At the prima facie stage, the court held that OpenAI’s storage of ANI’s works for training fell within Section 52(1)(a) of the Copyright Act, 1957, the fair dealing provision.[2]

    Outputs. The court found that ANI had not shown that ChatGPT memorised and reproduced its content.[4]

    Remember the limits of this order. At the interim stage, a court looks only at whether there is a prima facie case, the balance of convenience and irreparable harm. The judge made clear that these findings do not bind the court at the final trial, and the order may be appealed, so the position can change.

    3. The Law: Sections 51 and 52 of the Copyright Act, 1957

    Copyright law starts with a simple rule. Under Section 51, copying a protected work without the owner’s permission is infringement, unless an exception applies.[5] The exceptions are in Section 52. The one that matters here is Section 52(1)(a), which allows fair dealing with a work (other than a computer programme) for:

    • private or personal use, including research;
    • criticism or review; and
    • reporting current events.

    Notice what the Act does not contain: a special exception for text and data mining, the large-scale copying and analysis of content that AI training involves. The European Union, Japan and Singapore have such provisions in some form.[6] In India, the question therefore has to be fitted into the existing fair dealing categories, usually “private or personal use, including research”. Whether commercial AI training genuinely fits there is the real legal controversy, and the interim order is only a first view.

    Two Supreme Court decisions help frame the issue. In R.G. Anand v. Deluxe Films, the Court explained that copyright protects the expression of ideas, not the ideas themselves.[7] In Eastern Book Company v. D.B. Modak, it held that a work needs a “modicum of creativity” to be protected, rejecting both the “sweat of the brow” approach and a very high originality standard.[8] Both help when asking what exactly an AI model takes from a news article: facts, ideas or protected expression.

    4. Fair Dealing Versus Fair Use

    Students often mix up these two terms. India uses fair dealing: the Act lists specific purposes, and a use must fall within one of them. The United States uses fair use: Section 107 of its Copyright Act is open-ended and asks a court to weigh four factors, including the effect of the use on the market for the original.[9]

    The US debate has just moved on. On 29 September 2026, the Third Circuit became the first federal appeals court to rule on fair use in AI training, in Thomson Reuters v. ROSS Intelligence. It held that using Westlaw headnotes to train a competing, non-generative legal research tool was not fair use. It did not decide whether training a generative AI model is fair use.[10]

    The two courts are not in conflict. The US case concerned a rival product that substituted for Westlaw; the Delhi case concerns a chatbot, and its decision is interim. But the contrast shows how differently the question can be approached.

    5. The Government’s Proposal: A Compulsory Licence

    While the courts decide, the Government has been looking at the policy side. On 8 December 2025, a committee set up by the Department for Promotion of Industry and Internal Trade (DPIIT) released Part 1 of a Working Paper on Generative AI and Copyright.[11] It proposed a hybrid model: a mandatory blanket licence for AI training, combined with a statutory right for copyright owners to be paid, with royalties collected through a collective body. The consultation window was later extended to 6 February 2026.[12]

    The logic is that a free-for-all exception would leave creators unpaid, while requiring permission from every owner would make AI development impractical, especially for Indian start-ups. A statutory licence is a middle path.

    Notice the tension with the Delhi order. The DPIIT paper treats unlicensed training as something that calls for payment, while the High Court has prima facie accepted a fair dealing defence. If the courts finally hold that training is fair dealing, a compulsory payment scheme would be a new policy choice that Parliament would have to make by amending the Act.

    6. Why This Matters for Your Exams

    This is the kind of recent development examiners like for essays, current affairs sections and mains answers. Keep these points ready:

    • Case name, number and court: ANI Media v. OpenAI, CS(COMM) 1028/2024, Delhi High Court.
    • Date and nature of the order: 24 July 2026, interim, injunction refused.
    • Key provisions: Sections 51 and 52(1)(a) of the Copyright Act, 1957.
    • The gap in the law: no express text and data mining exception.
    • The policy response: DPIIT’s hybrid licensing model of December 2025.
    • The comparison: Indian fair dealing against US fair use, and the Third Circuit’s ROSS ruling.

    A good answer does not just state the order; it weighs both sides. AI developers argue that learning from existing material is how models work and that heavy restrictions would stifle innovation. Creators and publishers answer that their work is being used to build commercial products without payment, and that outputs can compete with the original.

    7. Conclusion

    India has not yet settled whether training an AI model on copyrighted material is lawful. The Delhi High Court’s interim order favours the AI company on the present record, but it is not the last word. The final trial, a possible appeal and the Government’s licensing proposal will all shape the answer. For students, the lesson is to read the order for what it actually decided, to remember that interim findings are provisional, and to understand the competing interests on both sides.

    Sources

    • [1] ANI Media Pvt. Ltd. v. OpenAI Inc., CS(COMM) 1028/2024, Delhi High Court (suit filed November 2024).
    • [2] ANI Media Pvt. Ltd. v. OpenAI OpCo LLC, CS(COMM) 1028/2024, Delhi High Court, interim order dated 24 July 2026 (Amit Bansal J.).
    • [3] Asia Law Portal, “AI training and copyright” (2026), law.asia.
    • [4] LexCounsel Law Offices, “India’s First AI Copyright Ruling: The Delhi High Court in ANI v. OpenAI”, Mondaq (12 August 2026).
    • [5] Copyright Act, 1957, ss. 51 and 52(1)(a).
    • [6] Copyright Act (Japan), Art. 30-4; Directive (EU) 2019/790, Arts. 3 and 4; Copyright Act 2021 (Singapore), computational data analysis exception.
    • [7] R.G. Anand v. Deluxe Films, (1978) 4 SCC 118.
    • [8] Eastern Book Company v. D.B. Modak, (2008) 1 SCC 1.
    • [9] Copyright Act of 1976 (United States), 17 U.S.C. § 107.
    • [10] Thomson Reuters Enterprise Centre GmbH v. ROSS Intelligence Inc., US Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit, 29 September 2026.
    • [11] DPIIT, Working Paper on Generative AI and Copyright, Part 1: “One Nation One Licence One Payment” (8 December 2025).
    • [12] DPIIT consultation on the Working Paper, extended to 6 February 2026.

    About the author: Taniya is a law student at the University Institute of Legal Studies, Himachal Pradesh University, Shimla.