India’s Federal Structure: Union, State and Concurrent Lists Explained

Comparative federalism scholars often describe India as “quasi-federal” or having a “federal structure with a unitary bias,” and the Seventh Schedule of the Constitution is where that description becomes concrete.

Three lists, not two

Most federal constitutions divide legislative power between the centre and the states using two lists. India’s Seventh Schedule uses three: the Union List (defence, foreign affairs, currency, and roughly 97 other subjects on which only Parliament can legislate), the State List (police, public health, agriculture, and other subjects reserved for state legislatures), and the Concurrent List (criminal law, marriage, labour, education, and other subjects where both Parliament and state legislatures can legislate, with central law prevailing in case of conflict under Article 254).

Built-in tilt toward the centre

Several features reinforce the “unitary bias” label: residuary powers (Article 248) rest with Parliament rather than the states, unlike the US model where residual power sits with the states; Parliament can legislate on a State List subject during a national emergency (Article 250) or if the Rajya Sabha resolves by two-thirds majority that it is in the national interest (Article 249); and Article 356 allows the centre to impose President’s Rule on a state, dissolving its elected government, under circumstances that have themselves generated significant constitutional litigation (notably S.R. Bommai v. Union of India, 1994, which narrowed the circumstances for its use and made it subject to judicial review).

Why foreign researchers study this model

India’s three-list structure, its emergency powers, and the Bommai case are commonly used in comparative constitutional law courses precisely because India combines federal form with centralising mechanisms rarely found together in classical federations like the US, Australia, or Germany. Researchers comparing cooperative versus coercive federalism often use India’s GST Council (a genuinely cooperative-federal body on tax policy) alongside Article 356 (a coercive-federal tool) as a single jurisdiction showing both ends of the spectrum.

Lexfolio’s constitutional law notes cover the Seventh Schedule and the Bommai case in further procedural depth.